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Abstract
This paper explores the meaning of refugee integration in a fragmented age where 
multi-culturalism is said to be dead. It focuses on the results of recent research in four cities 
in South and East Africa, which showed an increasing tendency towards new forms of 
association  that the author termed “communities of convenience”. The author reflects upon 
the lessons that these highly mobile African urban contexts offer for refugee integration in 
Britain.
Key words: Integration, Multi-culturalism, Authority, Inclusion, Immigrants. 
The Promise and Premise of Integration
Governments across Europe and North America have been ringing the multiculturalism’s 
death knell.1 Although often criticised by progressives as anti-feminist, homophobic and 
culturally essentialist, multi-culturalism’s end at the hands of right-leaning governments has 
proved disorienting.  If not multiculturalism, then what? While politicians have begun 
lighting fires beneath giant melting pots, will Somalis, Turks, and Poles soon be hunting 
foxes, drinking tea and tuning into test cricket? This vision may satisfy conservative 
fantasies, but are unlikely to be realised at a corner shop or community near you. More 
accurately and more importantly, they are unlikely to be realised in the communities where 
newly arrived refugees and immigrants find themselves. As Snel, et al, rightly note, “the old 
concept... that immigrants settle permanently and assimilate in the host country, has lost 
significance.”2 Ultimately, it will be empirics, not ethics that confound the assimilationist 
agenda. 
                                                            
1 See, for example, David Cameron’s Speech to the Munich Security Conference on 5 February 2011. 
(http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference/); P.J. Buchanan. 2010, ‘The 
End of Multiculturalism,’ The American Conservative (18 October) 
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/blog/2010/10/18/the-end-of-multiculturalism/. L. Harrison. 2008, 
‘The End of Multiculturalism: The US Must Be A Melting Pot – Not a Salad Bowl.’ Christian Science Monitor 
Online (February 26); R. Munck, R. 2008. ‘Review Essay: Multiculturalism and the Integration Agenda. 
‘Translocations: The Irish Migration, Race and Social Transformation Review. Vol. 3(1):164-168. 
2 E. Snel, G. Engebersen and A. Leerkes. 2006. ‘Transnational Involvement and Social Integration,’ Global 
Networks. Vol. 6(3): 285.
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For new immigrants, the world they occupy is often not one of structured by state 
social policy or dominant cultural norms.  In countries’ emerging immigrant gateways, 
transience and transgressions, of values as much as people, have become the norm.  What 
will emerge are communities of convenience – some cosmopolitan, some conflictual – driven 
more by pragmatic responses to the quotidian challenges of particular sites and times than a 
grand imagination of an integrated society.3 Amid the fluidity and fragmentation of these new 
gateways, novel modes of accommodation are emerging, double helix like, with ever 
evolving forms of exclusion. These more or less inclusive forms of co-existence, co-
habitation or conviviality—choose your term, just not integration—will less likely reflect the 
goals of government policies and initiatives than local demography and social dynamics. 
Only by purging our gaze of our own normative objectives whether assimilationist fantasy or 
cosmopolitan utopianism,4 can we begin to understand these interactions, the conditions 
producing them, and their potential consequences for our societies and our politics. That is 
what this paper tries to do. 
Using examples drawn from across newly urbanising African cities—what I term 
‘urban estuaries’—this paper is intended to help us to help reveal cracks in the ethical 
foundations on which integration debates are normally premised. The first is a clear 
distinction between who is a host and who is a guest. The metaphors of hospitality, welcome, 
and asylum are founded on this dichotomy as is the philosophy of Derrida, Kant, Taylor and 
others. The second is migrants’ desire to be part of a place bound community. If perhaps that 
is too strong, then the desire and willingness to be fully part of one rooted on their place of 
current residence be it city or a state. Doing so draws our attention to the importance of the 
spatial and temporal dimensions in which in which ‘integration’ occurs.5 Much as must 
reconsider our language of migrants and hosts, so too must we rethink our reliance on a 
language of national integration. Instead we must pan more widely and focus more locally to 
reveal both forms of multi-sited belonging and the complex dynamics and engagements of 
specific sites where people negotiate multiple, and often conflicting histories and social 
                                                            
3 I wish to thank Laavanya Kathiravelu for introducing me to the idea of ‘communities of convenience’, a notion 
that captures the pragmatic and evolving nature of loyalty and belonging in our fragmented era.
4 This responds to calls by Z. Skrbis, G. Kendall and I. Woodward. 2004. ‘Locating Cosmopolitanism: Between 
Humanist Ideal and Grounded Social Category,’ Theory, Culture and Society 21(6): 132; also U. Beck. 2009. 
‘Imagined Communities of Global Risk,’ Lecture for the Risk Conference in Shanghai. First Draft: 
Uncorrected Version, 2.
5 Such an approach is called for in M. Dikec, N. Clark and C Barnett. 2009. ‘Extending Hospitality: Giving 
Space, Taking Time,’ Paragraph. Vol. 32(1):1-14. 
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positions.6 What we see there is confusing and often corresponds poorly with our normative 
principles however conservative or cosmopolitan they may be. I hope the following 
discussion provides an empirical basis that can allow our philosophy to begin catching up 
with global dynamics.7
The rest of the paper proceeds through a short discussion of my research methods, 
approach and the data I employ/ It then moves on to a phenomenon I term the ‘urban 
estuary’: cities, or parts thereof, where the varied migrant trajectories intersect to generate 
novel forms of social interaction and authority. I then return to the themes outlined above: the 
distinction between host and migrant, the desirability and possibility of space-bound 
integration, and the mechanisms through which integration is achieved. Having largely 
jettisoned the metric of classical ‘integration’, the article concludes by suggesting a variety of 
other practiced modes of accommodation: markets, tactical cosmopolitanism, and odd forms 
of ethnic consociationalism. The final paragraphs speculate on what this may mean for 
Britain and other once ‘mono-cultural’ societies.  
Data, Methods and Approach
For a paper beginning with reference to state-sponsored multiculturalism in Europe, it 
may seem peculiar that the spaces and people described here largely include residents of 
Africa’s rapidly urbanising cities. The analogy between European immigration and patterns 
of African mobility is admittedly imperfect, but not without merit. For one, although this 
paper is empirically driven, it intended largely as a conceptual exercise: a means of 
inductively challenging presumptions about the meaning and mechanisms of integration as 
they are widely understood. In that sense we have much to learn from Africa’s urban 
estuaries where the nature of human mobility and intergroup engagement is creating a 
‘moment’ when new forms of social organization and ethico-legal orders are being forged. 
This is not the realization of any individual or group’s grand imagination, but the products of 
street level pragmatism and tactics. This may not represent the future of migration and 
integration in Europe, but remarkable levels of heterogeneity, ongoing mobility and 
                                                            
6 See S. Bhatia and A. Ram. 2001. ‘Rethinking ‘Acculturation’ in Relation to Diasporic Cultures and 
Postcolonial Identities’. Human Development. Vol. 44(1): 2. See also A. Spire, 2009. ‘Rethinking the Political 
Dimension of Migrations’. Contemporary European History. Vol. 18(1): 141.
7 Cf C. Calhoun. 2002. ‘The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travellers: Towards a Critique of Actually 
Existing Cosmopolitanism’ in S. Vertovec and R. Cohen (Eds.) Conceiving Cosmopolitanism – Theory, 
Context, Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 108.
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translocal loyalties and the state’s limited authority and reach among the urban poor are not 
unique to Africa’s cities. One only needs to look at the American ghettos, the French banlieus
or parts of deindustrialised Britain for suitable parallels. I suspect we can learn much by 
drawing from environments that are more extreme and consequences more dramatic.
Table One: Key Statistics for Research Sites, City and Country Levels
Johannesburg Maputo Nairobi
Population 1990 (millions) 1.898 .776 1.380
Population 2025 (millions) 4.041 2.560 5.871
Growth Rate (2005-2010) 3.52 3.90 3.76
Human Development Index * 129 172 147
Gini Coefficient of 
Inequality* 
.75 .52 .59
* Data at the national level  
Sources: United Nations Habitat, State of African Cities Report 2010, United Nations 
Development Report 2009 and United Nations World Urbanization Prospects 2007
This exploratory paper draws on an ecumenical set of data in illustrating patterns of 
movement and social interaction. Most of the information reflected here stems from 
migration-related research in Southern and Eastern Africa—beginning with Johannesburg 
and expanding to Nairobi and Maputo—undertaken between 2002 and 2010.  While 
recognising the severe limitations of available data on migration and urbanisation in African 
cities, Table One, shows that the cities are comparable on a number of axes. For one, the 
growth rates are quite similar (and rapid) across all three sites. Despite the similarities, there 
are also clear and significant differences in the human development levels of the three cities, 
an indication not only of wealth but a relatively effective proxy for state capacity and 
economic resources. The United Nations’ 2007 Human Development Index (HDI) ranked 
South Africa 129th, Kenya 147th, and Mozambique near the bottom at 172. However, the 
extent of wealth inequality also differs across countries. Due in part to its prosperity, South 
Africa is far more unequal than either Mozambique or Kenya. Given that its wealth is deeply 
spatialised as a result of Apartheid-era urban planning, parts of the country and sections of 
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every city – including Johannesburg – remain far poorer than the overall HDI score suggests.8
It was in those areas where the data were collected. 
Table Two: Selected Descriptive Characteristics of City Samples (%)
Johannesburg Maputo Nairobi
Nationality
Native Born 23.5 32.0 38.5
Foreign Born 76.5 68.0 61.5
Somali 28.7 0 31.3
Congolese 39.0 21.5 34.5
Rwandan 0 34.8 0
Mozambican 31.2 0 0
Burundi 0 36.7 0
Sudanese 0 0 31.5
Other 1.1 7 3.0
Gender
Male 59.7 72.9 62.1
Female 40.3 27.1 37.9
Age Groups
18-30 50.1 18.7 58.1
31-40 35.5 46.8 27.7
41-50 9.0 28.4 8.8
51+ 5.5 6.1 5.4
Highest Educational Level
None/some primary 7.1 5.3 19.0
Completed Primary or secondary 70.7 81.3 60.0
Some Tertiary 22.2 13.5 21.4
N 847 609 755
The survey data used here were largely generated from interviews with 2,211 people in the 
three cities. These data do not fully represent either the migrant or host populations in any of 
the sites, let alone the experience of migration and displacement elsewhere on the continent.9
                                                            
8 See J. Beal, O. Crankshaw and S. Parnell. 2002. Uniting a Divided City: Governance and Social Exclusion in 
Johannesburg, London: Earthscan; G. Götz and A. Simone, 2003. ‘On Belonging and Becoming in African 
Cities,’ in R. Tomlinson, R. A. Beauregard, L. Bremner, and X. Mangcu (Eds.), Emerging Johannesburg: 
Perspectives on the Postapartheid City, New York: Routledge.
9 The data used here were generated through collaboration with Tufts University, University of Nairobi, and 
Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo. The statistical analysis included here was either conducted by the 
author or draws on two, co-authored papers: L.B. Landau and M. Duponchel, 2011. ‘Laws, Policies, or Social 
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Rather, data collection targeted particular groups of foreigners categorized by nationality. 
Consequently, our information speaks most accurately about these groups. With the 
exception of Mozambicans included in the Johannesburg survey, the team selected 
groupsSomalis, Rwandans, Sudanese, and Congolesethat straddle the line between 
purely economic migrants and those who might be considered (in substance, if not in law), 
forced migrants or displaced persons. Given the lack of reliable statistics on the size of the 
foreign population, its composition, or, in many cases, on domestic population dynamics in 
any of the cities, effectively weighting the observation in the data in order to obtain a good 
representation of the reality is almost impossible. 
While each of the sites included here is a destination and transit point for domestic 
and international migration, together they express a diversity of social, economic and political 
characteristics that gives me the confidence to make modest generalization about trends
within estuarial zones or what others might call urban ‘gateways’ or ‘arrival cities.’10
Moreover, they are each destination and transit points for a ‘mixed flow’ of refugees, 
immigrants, circular migrants, and people transiting to communities and cities elsewhere. 
Table Two (above) provides some key statistics for the three cities. Although these cities are 
not representative all of the continent’s urban centres—and the focus on estuarial zones 
further limits the data’s generalisable—their diversity nevertheless reflect a variety of 
experiences to afford the basis for the kind of conceptual outline I hope to provide. The 
appearance of such similar processes in all the cases – including the often anomalous South 
Africa – further speaks to the importance of these trends and the suitability of the 
comparison. Wherever possible, I have included quotations and other qualitative evidence to 
provide additional texture and illustrations. Given the scope of the claims and the brevity of 
the document, this will be as unsatisfying to the reader as it was to the author. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Position? Capabilities and the Determinants of Effective Protection in Four African Cities.’ Journal of Refugee 
Studies. Vol. 24(1): 1-22; and L. Madhavan and L.B. Landau, ‘Bridges to Nowhere: Hosts, Migrants and the 
Chimera of Social Capital in Three African Cities.’ 2011. Population and Development Review. Vol. 37(3): 
473-497. 
10 See, for example, D. Saunders. 2011. Arrival City: The Final Migration and Our Next World. New York: 
Knopf; For a more scholarly approach, see A. Singer, S.W. Hardwick and C.B. Bretell (Eds.), 2008. Twenty-
First-Century Gateways Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban America. Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press. 
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Urban Estuaries & Elusive Hosts
Revealing the future of integration demands we first parse presumptions behind 
contemporary debates surrounding migrants in ‘western’ society and the meaning of 
hospitality. Only by rethinking the fundamental actors in the integration process—migrants 
and hosts—can we begin to understand the engagements likely to appear in the coming 
decades. Long before they were busy scuppering the Euro, the Greeks developed laws clearly 
defining foreigners—xenos—and drew firm distinctions between their rights and those of 
citizens.11 In this schema, and in almost all that following in the last two thousand years, the 
terms of engagement are to be determined by hosts while arrivants choose between 
compliance or turning back. Somewhat more recently, Kant reflected on the position of the 
outsider in trying, “to overcome some of the limits imposed by the division of the earth’s 
surface by national boundaries.” 12 In Perpetual Peace, he outlines two rules of hospitality 
intended to guide interactions in the age of the nation-state, the details of which are not 
important to us here.13 What matters are the actors that occupy his argument: hosts and states. 
Although Levinas and Derrida famously critique Kant for the limits his ethics place on 
guests,14 they nonetheless continue to speak of hosts and guests or variants thereof.15 Indeed, 
for Derrida, one of the greatest failings of Kant is the continued power the host exercises in 
naming new arrivals and placing them within an existing socio-legal or cognitive schema. 
For Derrida – as it presumably was for Kant, the Greeks, Taylor, Beck and a hundred 
other theorists – it proved difficult to comprehend a situation where distinctions between 
hosts and guests dissolve and the ability/right to structure engagements falter. That’s not quite 
fair. In fact, Derrida outlines such conditions in describing ‘unconditional hospitality’, a 
hospitality without limits. But, he argues, such a situation can not exist or be sustained 
because it ‘turns the home inside out,’16 or, in Miller’s summary, “A host is a guest, and a 
                                                            
11 See M. W. Westmoreland. 2008. ‘Interruptions: Derrida and Hospitality’. Kritike. Vol. 2(1): 1-10. 
12 Dikec 2009, 5. 
13 For those keen on a critical review of Kant, see G.W. Brown, 2010. ‘The Laws of Hospitality, Asylum 
Seekers and Cosmopolitan Right: A Kantian Response to Jacques Derrida.’ European Journal of Political 
Theory. Vol. 9(3): 309-327; S. Benhabib, 2002. The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global 
Era. Princeton: Princeton University Press.; M. Naas, 2002. ‘Hospitality as an Open Question’ in Taking on the 
Tradition. Stanford: Stanford University Press: 154-169. 
14 Mark. W. Westmoreland. 2008: 8 
15 Siby J. George. 2009. ‘Hospitality as Openness to the Other: Levinas, Derrida and the Indian Hospitality 
Ethos’ Journal of Human Values. Vol. 15(1): 33.
16 In Westmoreland 2008, 6. 
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guest is a host”.17 For Derrida, as for Kant, such a condition is effectively impossible to 
consciously accept as it denies the possibility of knowing who we, as hosts are or the role we 
should play. Moreover, denying our power to set the terms of engagement – or to at least take 
part in shaping our interaction – denies our individual and collective sovereignty: it “opens up 
the possibility for contamination in that it calls for no governing body such as a sovereign 
state or master of a home to establish laws and authority over another subject.”18
While few but the most utopian cosmopolitans call for the dissolution of host-guest 
divisions, these have already proved soluble in Africa’s urban estuaries. Snel, et al, rightfully 
note that the language of integration generally refers to the incorporation of new elements 
(immigrants) into an existing social system.”19 The question soon becomes what happens 
when the pace of change is such and levels of heterogeneity become so great that it makes 
little logical sense to speak of existing social systems. It is precisely into those environments 
in which migrants are typically arriving. New migrants –at least the ones we in typically 
worry about– do not usually move to stable, wealthy and coherent suburbs where with high 
levels of overlapping engagements and shared values. When they are allowed out of camps, 
they instead take up residence in what I have been calling ‘urban estuaries’: meeting points of 
people from various backgrounds, only some of which may be logically said to belong to a 
‘host’ community. What is more, it is not entirely clear that the people who are arriving wish 
to establish a place bound community in the areas where they live. These two factors – the 
absence of a discernable host and ongoing transience and translocalism –fundamentally shift 
the terms of our discussion. I will return presently to the implications of this shift. Before 
doing so, let me say a bit more about what is going on. 
                                                            
17 J.H. Miller, J.H. 1985. Deconstruction and Criticism. New York: Continuum, 221.
18 Westmoreland, 2006, 8
19 Snel, et al, 285; emphasis added
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Figure One: Transformation of Diepsloot, South Africa 1999-2009
Source: City of Johannesburg
As a result failing rural economies, conflicts, material inequalities, gentrification and 
other urban development programmes, people are moving into, out of and through cities in 
search of profit, protection, and passage elsewhere. Countries’ elite and well connected have 
evacuated inner-city neighbourhoods in favour of new peri-urban estates and gated 
communities.20 In their place, rural migrants, international migrants, and the ‘upwardly 
mobile’ urban poor converge. Elsewhere, once sparsely occupied peri-urban areas have 
become stations and destinations for people moving out of the city and those first coming to 
it. Figure One (above) graphically illustrates these changes’ extraordinary pace in Diepsloot, 
an area just outside of Johannesburg that was farmland just more than fifteen years ago.21
Similar transformations are occurring on the edges (and sometimes in the middle) of 
Kinshasa, Nairobi, Maputo and elsewhere. Clearly other regions rarely match the pace of 
Africa’s transformations, but Saunders 2011 book, Arrival City, makes a case for this as a 
global phenomenon. In these urban estuaries – the meeting place of multiple human flows –
                                                            
20 See United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN Habitat). 2008. State of the World’s Cities 
2010/2011: Bridging The Urban Divide. Nairobi: UN Habitat. J. Briggs and D. Mwamfupe, 2000. ‘Peri-urban 
Development in an Era of Structural Adjustment in Africa: The City of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,’ Urban 
Studies, Vol. 37: 797–809.
21 For more on Diepsloot’s history, see A. Harber, 2011. Diepsloot. Cape Town: Knopf. Also B. Bearak, 2011. 
‘Watching the Murder of an Innocent Man.’ New York Times Online (2 June 2011) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/05/magazine/watching-the-murder-of-an-innocent-
man.html?pagewanted=all
RLI WORKING PAPER No.1 Page 12 of 26
new social socio-economic formations are taking shape.22  Figures Two and Three (below) 
illustrate the close overlap between international and domestic migration in South Africa. 
Figure Two: International Migrants in South Africa23
Figure Thee: Trans-Provincial Migrants in South Africa
                                                            
22 AbdouMaliq Simone captures some of these dynamics in, 2009. City Life from Jakarta to Dakar: Movements 
at the Crossroads New York; London: Routledge.
23 Maps developed by Forced Migration Studies at Wits with UNOCHA (Pretoria) using data from the 2001 
national census. 
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Much like natural estuaries where the interaction between tides and rivers create unique and 
dynamic ecosystems, these urban gateways generating distinct socio-political forms through 
the multiple movements and dynamics taking place within them. In these zones, 
ethnic/national heterogeneity and cultural pastiche are often the empirical norms, not 
exceptions.24 Among other effects, these forces are generating greater disparities of wealth, 
language, and nationality, along with diverse gender roles, life trajectories, and 
intergenerational tensions in both migrant-sending and receiving communities. Through 
geographic movement—into, out of, and within cities—urban spaces that for many years had
only tenuous connections with the people and economies of the rural hinterlands of their own 
countries are increasingly the loci of economic and normative ties with home villages and 
diasporic communities spread (and spreading) across the continent and beyond.25 While we 
must be wary of speaking in metaphors – and migrants are often equated to influxes, tsunamis 
and other dangerous aquatic phenomena – the notion of the estuary helps capture the 
distinctiveness of a given space shaped by multiple agents bound largely by their transience 
and marginalisation.26 For present purposes, the question is how, in such spaces can we 
continue to speak of hosts and migrants? And without bounded and identifiable political 
communities to set the term of engagement, what might integration come to mean?  
Table Three illustrates the degree to which the cities in questions are, indeed, cities of 
strangers. Table Four further demonstrates the fluidity of the population after arrival. While 
these figures overestimate the total movements – remember sampling focused on ‘gateway’ 
neighbourhoods and estuarial zones – they nonetheless demonstrate the degree to which 
migrant populations are present and why such mobility offers resistance to the consolidation 
of community. 
                                                            
24 See B. Larkin, 2004. ‘Bandiri Music, Globalization, and Urban Experience in Nigeria,’ Social Text, 22: 91–
112; A. Mbembe, 2001. On the Postcolony. Berkeley: University of California Press; A. Simone, 2004. ‘People 
As Infrastructure: Intersecting Fragments in Johannesburg,’ Public Culture Vol. 16: 407-429; H. Zlotnick, 
2006. ‘The Dimensions of Migration in Africa,’ in Tienda, Findley, Tollman, and Preston Whyte (Eds.). Africa 
on the Move. Johannesburg: Wits University Press: 15-37.
25 P. Geschiere, 2005. ‘Funerals and Belonging: Different Patterns in South Cameroon,’ African Studies 
Review, 48: 45-64; D. Malauene, 2004. ‘The Impact of the Congolese Forced Migrants’ “Permanent Transit” 
Condition on their Relations with Mozambique and Its People.’ (MA thesis), Johannesburg: University of the 
Witwatersrand; M. Diouf, 2000. ‘The Senegalese Murid Trade Diaspora and the Making of a Vernacular 
Cosmopolitanism,’ Public Culture, Vol. 12: 679-702.
26 L. Malkki speaks explicitly of the dangerous use of metaphor in describing refugees and other migrants (1995 
‘Refugees and Exile: From “Refugee Studies” to the National Order of Things.’ Annual Review of 
Anthropology, Vol. 24.
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Table Three: Percentage of Population Resident in City by Time
Johannesburg Maputo Nairobi
Years Spent in City
Less than 2 years 24.5 17.5 10.6
Two to Five Years 19.7 21.5 16.3
Five to Ten Years 34.5 40.9 39.6
N 847 609 755
Source: Author’s survey data.
Table Four: Average Number of Moves among Non-nationals since Coming to the 
City, 2006
Johannesburg Maputo Nairobi
3.1 1.8 1.5
Source: Author’s survey data.
Connections and regular shifts between rural (or peri-urban) and urban areas are a critical 
factor in slowing the emergence of urban regimes which, rather than destinations, are often 
stations on an ongoing journey. For many moving for work, the primary motivation is profit 
and the need to extract urban resources to subsidize the ‘real’ life they live elsewhere. Indeed, 
in many instances spouses and children remain elsewhere while single men and women earn 
money in the cities to sustain them (see Table Five). Although urban residents may establish 
second urban families, in many instances social, ethnic and political ties to rural areas prevent 
full social integration into urban communities. The intention to retire in the countryside or 
move elsewhere further limits people’s financial and emotional investments in urban areas. In 
some instances, significant numbers of the foreign-born population – or non-local citizens –
arrive in the city seeking protection from conflict and persecution with the intentions to return 
home or move on when conditions allow. This helps generate a kind of permanent 
temporariness in which they actively resist incorporation.27 For many, cities have, become 
                                                            
27 C W Kihato, 2009. “Migration, Gender and Urbanisation in Johannesburg” (PhD diss., University of South 
Africa); L. B. Landau, 2006. ‘Transplants and Transients: Idioms of Belonging and Dislocation in Inner-city 
Johannesburg,’ African Studies Review, Vol. 49:125-145; Malauene, 2004. 
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‘places of flows’ where rooting and local representation is not the goal.28 Moreover, the 
burdens and binding that connections and political participation offer are often something to 
be avoided.29 Given the insecurity of land tenure, the possibility of violence, and ongoing 
economic deprivation, people often maintain feet in multiple sites without firmly rooting 
themselves in any.30
Table Five: Translocal Financial Connections by City
Johannesburg Maputo Nairobi
Native Born Local 41.6 55.6 62.3
Foreign Born Local 58.9 26.1 33.0
Native Born Migrant 53.7 54.2 57.5
Foreign Born Migrant 43.3 23.3 8.6
N 847 609 755
Source: Author’s survey data.
Table Six: Expectation of Residence in Two Years (Percentage)
Johannesburg Maputo Nairobi
Native Born Local 50.0 76.8 75.4
Foreign Born Local 68.9 65.2 44.4
Native Born Migrant 45.0 65.6 69.3
Foreign Born Migrant 43.2 55.5 52.5
N 847 609 755
Source: Author’s survey data.
What we see in these environments is populations where the possibility of a strong, central 
social authority is deeply challenged. So too is the possibility of achieving—should anyone 
want to—a strong territorially bound set of allegiances that could demarcate insiders and 
outsiders, hosts and guests. Given that most migrants are citizens, citizenship and 
documentation is not a major variable in structuring these relations. Although Africa’s 
                                                            
28 See M. Castells, 1996. “The Space of Flows,” in The Castells Reader on Cities and Social Theory, Ida Susser 
(Ed). Oxford: Blackwell:314-365
29 P. Kankonde, 2010. “Transnational Family Ties, Remittance Motives, and Social Death among Congolese 
Migrants: A Socio-Anthropological Analysis,”‘ Journal of Comparative Family Studies, Vol. 41: 225-244; M. 
L Madsen, 2004. ‘Living for Home: Policing Immorality among Undocumented Migrants in Johannesburg,’ 
African Studies, Vol. 63: 173–192. 
30 See I. Freemantle, 2010. “‘You Can Only Claim Your Yard and Not a Country:’ Exploring Contexts, 
Discourse and Practices of Quotidian Cosmopolitanism Amongst African Migrants in Johannesburg” (PhD 
diss., University of the Witwatersrand).
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colonial and postcolonial cities have been the one geographic site where the state’s powers 
are most evident,31 they are rarely able to enforce strong prohibitions on non-nationals who 
make their way into cities.32 Formal citizenship may have symbolic value for some, but with 
only limited enforcement capacity and a minimal reliance on state provided services –
schools, clinics, jobs – documentation and legal status do little. At the most practical level 
they are poor predictors of people’s welfare.33 Even in South Africa, arguably the continent’s 
‘strongest’ state, these processes are negotiated on the ground through a panoply of 
rationalities and calculations, sometimes involving laws and state actors but not always in 
predictable ways.34 That is what the process of integration will look like. What it produces is 
something we have yet to fully understand. 
Integration and Authority
So where does this leave us? If Bulley is right that, “hospitality requires some notion of an ‘at 
home’ for its possible performance,” then what is integration when we see multiple homes or 
where everyone is both host and visitor?35  Is this the atomised disorder that Kaplan described 
many years ago?36 Bulley tries to address this by suggesting that where everyone is both 
guest and host, everyone is a hostage – no one sets the terms of engagement and we are all 
subject to everyone else’s will. Derrida proffers the term ‘hostipitality,’ to connate the 
hostility such situations of coerced hospitality tend to generate. Hostility and a manifestation 
of spatially chauvinist rhetoric is certainly one possible outcome. Indeed, at first glance it 
explains what has been among the most visible reactions to immigrants and outsiders across 
Africa. Few in South Africa will forget the 2008 violence in which more than 60 were killed 
and 120 000 displaced in a melee driven by violent efforts to claim space in the name of 
                                                            
31 J. Herbst, 2000. States and Power in Africa. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; M. Bratton, 2006. 
‘Popular Reactions to State Repress: Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe,’ African Affairs, 106: 21–45.
32 See, for example, M. Swilling, A Simone and F. Khan. 2003. “My Soul I Can See: The Limits of Governing 
African Cities in an Era of Globalization and Complexity,” in P. McCarney and R.E. Stren (Eds.), Governance 
on the Ground: Innovations and Discontinuities in the Cities of the Developing World. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press.
33 L.B. Landau and M. Duponchel, 2011. 
34 CF. T. B. Hansen and F. Stepputat (Eds.), 2010. States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the 
Postcolonial State. Durham: Duke University Press.
35 Bulley, Dan. 2006. ‘Negotiating Ethics: Campbell, Ontopology, and Hospitality,’ Review of International 
Studies. Vol. 32: 659.
36 R. D. Kaplan, 1994. “The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism and Disease are 
Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of our Planet.” The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 273:44-76.
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one’s ethnicity, political party, or nationality.37 But it is facile to claim that membership 
always settles to a dichotomous norm of outsider and host with one group seeking dominance 
over one or more others. Not only do the numbers of actors involved complicate these 
processes, but such outcomes depend on people seeing both the incentive and means to make 
exclusive claims over specific spaces and the resources within them. This happens, but it is 
not always the case; at least not for everyone.  
The remainder of this paper reviews—schematically given the confines of the 
medium—the mechanism and ethos I, together with my colleagues, have observed in our 
‘estuarial’ research. This is work in its early stages so the ideas below are speculative and not 
yet fully theorised. Underlying my analysis is the question of how varied forms of belonging 
and systems of allocating rights and privilege are taking shape in environments with weak, if 
any, divisions between hosts and guests. I begin by considering broad indicators of social 
capital, a precursor to the formation of bounded (if not spatially defined) identities. I then 
explore the role of religious affiliations before touching on other forms of membership and 
organisation: consociational gangsterism, tactical cosmopolitanism, and ultimately (if 
speculatively) a kind of market-based liberalism. 
Whether religious, cultural or economic, collective participation is a potentially 
important mechanism for inculcating a sense of common purpose and forging the social 
connections necessary to suffuse a population with common perspectives, values and ethics. 
It is also necessary if we are to speak of groups somehow negotiating as hosts, guests, or 
something in between. However, given the population’s volatility and orientation, social 
networks are often spread thinly across many people and places. As such it comes as little 
surprise that the surveys show remarkably low levels of trust between ethnic and national 
groups. What is more important for our purposes is the limited trust and bonds within them. 
Even among citizens in both Johannesburg and Maputo, levels of social capital—trust of each 
other and public their institutions—are strikingly low.38 Nairobi offers a slightly more 
trusting environment, although here too the data reflect deep tensions. Networks of clan, 
                                                            
37 See the chapters by Neftegodian and Misago in L. Landau. 2011. Exorcising the Demons Within: Xenophobia, 
Violence and Statecraft in Contemporary South Africa, Johannesburg: Wits University Press. Also P. 
Geschiere, 2009. The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa and Europe. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
38 Cf. R. Putnam, 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon 
& Schuster.
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neighbourhood, or coreligionists undoubtedly exist,39 but these are often fragmented and 
functional, organized without an explicit recognition or sense of mutual obligation to those 
beyond familial boundaries.40 Instead, they are often limited to assisting others only to 
overcome immediate risks or if a corpse needs returning to a country or community of 
origin.41 Among neither migrants nor the ostensible host population can we speak of a 
community or set of overlapping institutions that are engaged in a collective project. These 
may eventually cohere into some form of widespread norms or implicit sense of a collective 
enterprise, but given the populations’ dynamics and the limited engagement with common 
institutions, such an outcome seems particularly unlikely. Tables Seven and Eight illustrate 
the remarkably low levels of institutional affiliations and trust across the three cities in which 
we conducted research. 
Table Seven: Organisational Affiliations by City and Migration Status
Johannesburg Maputo Nairobi
Belongs to Religious Organization
Native Born Local 66.3 73.7 92.0
Foreign Born Local 54.4 56.5 53.0
Native Born Migrant 52.8 72.9 92.8
Foreign Born Migrant 48.8 72.6 20.1
Belongs to Cultural Organization
Native Born Local 9.0 8.1 24.6
Foreign Born Local 22.2 17.4 4.4
Native Born Migrant 7.4 3.1 20.9
Foreign Born Migrant 6.7 2.6 4.9
Belongs to Credit Association
Native Born Local 9.0 40.4 39.9
Foreign Born Local 23.3 26.1 9.6
Native Born Migrant 17.6 37.5 32.7
Foreign Born Migrant 13.2 29.5 3.2
Source: Author’s survey data.
                                                            
39 See V. Nzayabino, “Spiritual Ecology: The Role of the Church in Territorialising Belonging and its Impact on 
Integration of Migrants in South Africa” (MA thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg).
40 See M. Sommers, 2001. Fear in Bongoland: Burundi Refugees in Urban Tanzania. New York: Berghahn 
Books. 
41 M. Madsen, “Policing”; E.A. Maina Ayiera, 2008. ‘Burying Our Dead in Your City: Interpreting Individual 
Constructs of Belonging in the Context of Burial of Loved Ones in Exile,’ (MA thesis, University of 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2008); J. A Andersson, 2006. ‘Informal Moves, Informal Markets: International 
Migrants and Traders from Mzimba District, Malawi,’ African Affairs 105: 375–397.
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Table Eight: Perception of Trust
Johannesburg Maputo Nairobi
Have Trust in Native Born
Native Born Local 75.6 50.7 52.1
Foreign Born Local 11.6 57.9 25.7
Native Born Migrant 77.9 62.5 65.7
Foreign Born Migrant 25.0 33.7 26.3
Have Trust in Foreigners
Native Born Local 33.3 29.8 22.6
Foreign Born Local 32.9 34.8 27.8
Domestic Migrant 37.4 36.9 22.4
Foreign Born Migrant 41.2 46.3 41.1
Have Trust in Co-Nationals 
(Foreign Born Only)
Local 26.6 36.8 49.6
Migrant 48.6 48.6 48.6
Source: Author’s survey data.
Religion is the one notable exception to relative absence of social organisation among the 
populations under discussion. Throughout Europe and Asia, religious institutions have 
played central roles in binding population to each other and to place (and in excluding 
everyone else).42 Where the state has faint influence, they can serve to help generate 
alternative subjectivities and publics. However, a combination of factors, including the 
increasing heterogeneity of the urban population, effectively denies the possibilities that 
religious institutions can serve a similar role in contemporary Africa cities. Among the 
Nairobi citizenry we surveyed, for example, 65.6% were Protestant, 30.6% Catholic, 2.7% 
                                                            
42 See, for example, Clifford Geertz, 1980. Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
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Muslim with only 0.3% claiming no religion. In Johannesburg, the sample was 59.7% 
Protestant, 18.8% no religion, 14.1% Catholic, and 6.8% Muslim. (The foreign born 
population in Johannesburg was more evenly divided with 39% Protestants, 28.5% 
Catholics, 26% Muslims, and 6.3 claiming no religion.) While urban Africans are strongly 
religious, the denominational divisions within those affiliations—and the often fractured 
and conflictual relationships among them—can serve more to divide than create a unified 
network with which to dissemination messages of unity and sanctions to achieve it. 
Along with the sheer diversity of competing claims for religion and belonging, the 
liturgical content of many churches serves to further undermine the possible emergence of a 
territorially bound or state-centred subjectivity. This is perhaps most visible in the ever 
expanding pool of Pentecostal churches operating within Africa’s urban centres. At one level, 
these inclusive (often massive) institutions offer the possibility of bridging barriers between 
various groups. As one Zimbabwean migrant in Johannesburg stated, ‘In the church, they 
help us in many ways, no matter where you come from, they just help you.’ While they offer 
a sense of salvation in the form of ‘health and wealth’, they are distinctly post-territorial in 
their outlook. Although there is not space here to reflect the diversity of testimonies and 
preaching included in even one five hour mass, many build on their strong connections to 
institutions in Nigeria, Ghana, Congo and the United States. For many of the churches’ 
founders—who are themselves migrants—their current pulpit is merely a place where they 
can enter a global social universe. In the words of the Nigerian Pastor at the Mountain of Fire 
and Miracles church in Johannesburg, ‘Africa is shaped like a pistol, Nigeria is the trigger 
and South Africa is the mouth from where you can shoot out the word of god.’ For others, 
they have been sent on a mission to Kenya, Mozambique or elsewhere to help counter post-
colonial malaise – including corruption and state oppression—with a message of truth. 
Moreover, while they may preach tolerance, many of these churches generate a set of 
translocal and, often, anti-political tenets of belonging. Their fragmentary and often 
conflictual sources of religious authority further serve to deny the state—or indeed even a 
single church—the possibility of naming what is good and the direction the collective should 
follow. 
Religion, at least as described above, provides a mechanism that allows people to be 
in a place but not off it: to be neither host nor guest. This it shares with what I have argued is 
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a form of ‘tactical cosmopolitanism’ on the part of migrants.43 Recognising ascendant forms 
or exclusion levied against them, migrants draw on a variegated language of belonging that 
makes claims to the city while positioning them in an ephemeral, superior, and unrooted 
condition where they can escape localised social and political obligations. Unlike theoretical 
or ‘high’ cosmopolitanism, these are not necessarily grounded in normative ideas of 
‘openness’ or intended to promote universal values of any form. Rather, migrants practically 
and rhetorically draw on various, often competing, systems of cosmopolitan rights and 
rhetorics to insinuate themselves, however shallowly, in the networks and spaces needed to 
achieve specific practical goals. These include, pan-Africanism, human rights rhetoric, and 
the language of the elite cosmopolitanism: of being global players in the new age. Unlike 
transnationalism, which is often about belonging to multiple communities – or shuttling 
between them—these are more ‘decentred’ tactics that emphasise individualism, generality 
and universality.44 This leaves them, in Friedman’s words, “betwixt and between without 
being liminal…participating in many worlds without becoming part of them”.45 This 
cosmopolitanism- especially in its current form – constitutes a form of ‘experiential 
culture’,46 but one that has risen from the need to achieve tactical targets rather than being the 
result of an appreciation of cultural diversity or philosophical consideration. 
In Dandora, an estuarial zone to the east of Nairobi, we are beginning to see the 
foundations of what I have, for lack of a better word, termed a kind of consociational-
gangsterism between the Kikuyu-based Mungiki, the Luo ‘Taliban’ and Kamjesh, a resource 
driven neighbourhood gangsterism racket.47 While these groups have been around in one 
                                                            
43 L. B. Landau and I. Freemantle. 2010. ‘Tactical Cosmopolitanism and Idioms of Belonging: Insertion and 
Self-Exclusion in Johannesburg.’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Vol. 36(3): 375-390.
44 cf. Pogge, T.W. 2002. ‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty’, Ethics, 103(1): 48; also V. Roudometof, 2005. 
‘Transnationalism, Cosmopolitanism and Glocalization,’ Current Sociology, 53(1): 113–135.
45 S. Vertovec, 2006. ‘Fostering Cosmopolitanisms: A Conceptual Survey and a Media Experiment in Berlin,’ in 
Lenz, G.H., Ulfers, F. and Dallmann, A. (eds.) Towards a New Metropolitanism: Reconstituting Public 
Culture, Urban Citizenship, and the Multicultural Imaginary in New York and Berlin. Heidelberg: 
Universitätsverlag. P. 3-10. See also G. Simmel, 1964. The Sociology of George Simmel. Translated by Wolff, 
K. New York: Free Press, p. 98. 
46 M. Lamont, M. (2000) ‘Ordinary Cosmopolitanisms: Strategies for Bridging Boundaries among Non-college 
Educated Workers’, paper presented at the ‘Conceiving Cosmopolitanism Conference’, University of Warwick 
(April 27- 29), p. 2.
47 The description of Dandora draws from ongoing research by Sharon Mina Olago. The description included 
here is based on a preliminary field report and interpersonal discussions. For background on Nairobi and the 
violence referred to in the paragraph, see International Crisis Group (2008), Kenya in Crisis, in: Africa Report, 
137 (21 February). Also Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (2008), Report of the Commission 
of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), (15 October 2008), online: 
http://www.dialoguekenya.org/creport.aspx. 
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form another for decades, they have gained increased prominence and power in the multi-
party era following the end of Daniel Arap Moi’s presidency. During this time they have 
moved from ‘cultural’ associations to bodies taking on state-like functions: providing 
security, taxing transport avenues, and regulating access to services and land. What is 
important for our purposes is the source of their legitimacy. While at least two of the groups
(the Mungiki and the Taliban) have ethnic origins, the spaces where they claim dominance as 
‘host’ are far beyond the city limits. There have been fights for dominance over urban space 
in the past, the massive bloodshed following Kenya’s 2007 elections – in which branches of 
both ethnic groups were directly involved – seems to have encouraged them to reach a kind 
of accommodation where they jointly manage the suburb. Entry and residence in the area is 
now allocated less on ethnic grounds than on the basis of what might be called ‘civic 
extortion’: if you can pay, you can come in and stay. Their ‘right’ to extract these resources 
comes less from their ethnic foundations that their relative monopoly on the use of force 
and—critically—their ability to provide a relatively predictable and stable environment for 
their residents. The system may not be inequitable o universally inclusive and it is most 
certainly coercive, but the emerging mode of regulation is primarily civic and material, not 
ethnic. It is tied to place, but one’s entry does not depend (at least not entirely) on where you 
are from. In this way they look similar to the medieval protection rackets Tilly famously 
described.48 Under such system, the incentive is to accumulate residents and the resources
they can provide regardless of their backgrounds. 
In Ongata Rongai, a rapidly growing region on Nairobi’s periphery, we are beginning 
to document a remarkable means of denying simple categorization between hosts and 
outsiders.49 Although technically outside of the city, the settlement’s proximity to main 
transport routes and the availability of land has made it an attractive space for migrants 
moving out of Nairobi as well as those moving towards it. The land’s ‘original’ inhabitants 
were Maasai – at least as understood by almost all of the sites current residents—but they 
have largely evacuated the settlement, selling off their land and taking their cattle elsewhere. 
In their stead groups from all over Kenya have moved in. Although the Kikuyu are the largest 
group numerically, they by no means dominate the space or make exclusive claims to it. 
                                                            
48 C. Tilly. 1985. ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.’ In P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. 
Skocpol (Eds.), Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
49 The discussion of Ongata Rongai draws heavily from M.J. Otieno, 2011, The Dominant Migrants 
Championing the Course of Development in Ongata Rongai Peri Urban Area. An unpublished report based on 
research conducted on behalf of the African Centre for Migration and Society. 
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Indeed, no one does. In stark contrast to sites across urban Kenya, there seems to be a 
remarkably high level of ethnic mixing and peaceful conviviality. Apart from Olekasasi 
estate which had become the preferred destination for the Somalis (Kenyan and Somali 
nationals), access to residential housing and business premises appears to be determined 
almost completely by market mechanisms. In interviews with officials and land owners, they 
all spoke of the need to ensure ethnic mixing and some level of conviviality. This is not a 
form of integration managed by the state nor any other identifiable actor. 
Unlike Dandora, the Rongai’s market-driven schema does not even rely on regular 
coercive threats to maintain the order. Rather, recognising the dangers of ethnic chauvinism 
in a space that no one group can effectively dominate, residents have developed a kind of 
liberal ethos which provides everyone equal access. Here discrimination is not based one’s 
origins, political affiliations or religion, but simply by a willingness to play by local’s rules. 
But these are unwritten and diffuse rules based largely on market principles. Although free 
markets notoriously and effectively disguise inequality, power and other restrictions on 
freedoms, by contrast to deep seated spatio-ethnic or nationalist exclusion, they reflect the 
kind of liberation in Marxist sense. By allowing people to retain ethnic, religious, or forms of 
extra-local loyalties – both religion and ethnicity remain highly visible in Rongai – residents 
may also inadvertently be generating a kind of radical multiculturalism, a “pluralisation of 
possibilities of being on the same territory.”50 Were he still alive, Levinas would undoubtedly 
be pleased at what he would see in Ongata Rongai: if we all are sojourners, he argued, then 
on what basis can we exclude? 
If nothing else, the paragraphs above suggest some of the possible means though 
which long-term residents, domestic migrants and non-citizens are simultaneously finding 
their ways in a new (and ever-changing) social landscape. Even domestic migrants may have 
as little in common with the people they find in the city as those coming from across 
international boundaries. The rapid expansion of urban populations—and its specific 
geography which tends to concentrate migration and urban growth in particular urban 
gateway neighbourhoods –calls into question the use of the term “local” or “host” to talk 
about the destination areas.  It also suggests that the mechanisms through which rights to 
space and other resources are rationed are varied.  The ethics behind them – when regulatory 
                                                            
50 D. Campbell, D. 1998. National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 162
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systems are coherent enough for them to be identified – are similarly complex and deserving 
of careful consideration and attention. 
Final Notes on The Future of Integration 
Ireland or Britain may not yet be as diverse as Singapore or South Africa, but they have 
become more so and are likely to continue on that path and patches of them are already 
among the most diverse places in the world. I can not match the data presented here with 
comparable information on cities and communities in Europe or North America. Ideally we 
would be able to present maps similar to those shown here illustrating what I imagine are 
close overlaps between new immigrants, older immigrants, and poor or otherwise 
marginalised British citizens. Places like West Ham and Brixton come to mind although there 
are certainly others spread across the country. While extreme, the hybridity, transience and 
translocalism described above are also not unique to African cities. Gray argues that while 
European policies typically portray host populations – in her case Irish citizens—as a largely 
undifferentiated ‘society’, they are in fact “a multiplicity of coexisting life styles and 
grouping.”51 Some may be the poor and marginal who, while decidedly British, no longer 
subscribe to a single national narrative. The riots that took place over the summer in 2011 
point to this possibility. The multiplicity of life styles will also increasingly include previous 
immigrant groups whose allegiances to Britain may themselves be frail or faint. It is for this 
very reason that Levitt and Glick-Schiller argue for an analytical perspective on society that 
is not immediately bound by geography, but allows us to consider other principles as the 
basis for integration and belonging.52 This does not mean abandoning the importance of 
space, but rather to consider the relationships of the people occupying it to each other, to 
others, and to a range of territories. 
To be sure, European states retain a much stronger presence and seem to be doing 
ever more to regulate the people coming to their countries; where they live, and how long 
they stay.53  The diversity I describe above has also fragmented system of political authority. 
                                                            
51 B. Gray. 2006. ‘Migration Integration Policy? A Nationalist Fantasy of Management and Control’. 
Translocations: The Irish Migration, Race and Social Transformation Review. Vol. 1(1): 130.
52 P. Levitt and N. Glick-Schiller. 2007. ‘Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field 
Perspective on Society’. In A. Portes and J. DeWind (Eds.). Rethinking Migration: New Theoretical and 
Empirical Perspectives. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books. : 181-218.
53 Spire. 2009, 135. 
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Rather than the kind of ‘nested’ systems Eckstein and Gurr describe (a perspective that 
typically informs) national laws and policies,54 political authority in practice is often faint, 
unevenly applied, and driven by competing imperatives and logics. Even in South Africa, 
perhaps the most technologically sophisticated sub-Saharan African country, there is scant 
ability to predict, plan for or track movements at anything but the most aggregate level and 
the police often apply rules in ways that work against stated policy goals.55 Ironically, 
Europe’s effort to control and relative ability to do so may help generate precisely the kinds 
of self-alienation and translocal communities I have described. In some sense this may reflect 
what Beck terms a ‘coercive Cosmopolitanism’:56 if people are not allowed to settle due to 
policy or perceived persecution, they will – as they have done in South Africa – develop 
strategies that work against the power of those who would exclude: a cosmopolitanism driven 
by necessity, not ethical commitments or desires. 
Calhoun argues that there’s a need for people to philosophically and morally catch up 
with the global problems and dynamics of the day.57 I am not a philosopher and I do not 
claim a vision for what spaces should look like or how we come to terms with the multiple 
claims bridging loyalties, spaces and peoples. Given the multiplicity of trajectories and emic 
communal affiliations, simply mapping what is emerging is elusive and bewildering; 
speaking of what should be seems foolish. What I can say is that the foundations for modern 
‘ontopological’ or Weberian forms of territorially bounded identity, all preconditions for a 
Kantian or even Derridian ethics of hospitality, are increasingly cracked and crumbling. The 
forms of individual or communal recognition that we depend on in talking about integration 
are often more ascribed fictions that identifiable social manifestations. Without a centralized 
authority or coercive force to direct an emergent, practical ethics, we see instead a varied 
range of real and existing multiculturalisms which can piece together stands of 
cosmopolitanism and communalism; or tolerance and territorial tyranny in ways that have 
hitherto seemed almost unimaginable. These communities of convenience need not be 
                                                            
54 H. Eckstein and T. R. Gurr. 1975. Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry. New York: 
John Wiley and Sons.
55 See L. B. Landau and A. Segatti with J.P. Misago. Governing Migration & Urbanisation in South African 
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Monopoly? Informal Immigration Enforcement in South Africa’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 36 (2): 
465-82; J. Hornberger. 2011. Policing and Human Rights: The Meaning of Violence and Justice in the 
Everyday Policing of Johannesburg. London: Routledge. 
56 Beck 2009: 5.
57 C. Calhoun, 2002. 
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logically consistent since they make few claims to universalism or, indeed, to an underlying 
logic. They are practical and pragmatic – if not always equitable – modes of engagement. 
Whether these eventually crystallise or bind current and future residents of given sites 
(or spaces affected by them) remains to be seen. But we will only be able to see them for 
what they are if we shed our own normativities and begin to recognize that even the language
of integration evokes elements of social and political authority that, if present, may be only 
fleeting. We see here what Derrida termed a ‘perpetual uneasiness’58  where coming to rest, a 
precondition of a negotiated settlement, is all but impossible. We must also revisit the 
approach pioneered by the Chicago school to see integration not as something driven by 
states and policies as if often the case in discussions of European policy,59 but as a set of 
practices migration and integration from the point of view of those on the move and those 
within whom they engage, be it where they live, where they are from or where they intend to 
go.  
                                                            
58 In Bulley 2006: 657.
59 See Spire’s 2009 critique, p. 137.
